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PORTRAIT OF THE NEW SUPREME COURT
WALTER B. KENNEDYt
Twenty years ago Professor Walter B. Kennedy warned against the impending break-
down of constitutional and common law, the erosion'of the doctrine of stare decisis, and
the skepticism regarding legal principles. Pragmtism As a Philosophy of Law (1925) 9
MARQUETTE L. REv. 63. Since then his writing has been devoted principally to the thesis
that the above stated evils have been increasing down the years.
In the present article Professor Kennedy deals with the latest and most startling phase of
the crumbling of legal precedents and case-law-the frank disclosure by members of the
Supreme Court of their departure from principles and precedents, a confusion and dissent
in decisions unparalleled in Supreme Court history.
His paper is timely and provocative; it attempts to make articulate the feelings of lawyer
and layman regarding the present situation; it is also constructive. The FoRvHAM LAw
REviEw believes that the subject matter opens up a problem of gravest importance and
invites comment to the end that ours may continue to be a government of laws and not
of men.-Editorial note.
THE people and press of America have suddenly discovered that there is
dissension and division among the Justices of the United States
Supreme Court.' The new Court, reconstructed a few years ago and
t Acting Dean and Professor of Law, Fordham University, School of Law.
Because of lack of time, it has not been possible to document fully some of the statements
made in this paper. But it is believed that all of the argument is subject to proof and
that much of it has been developed in other articles. A list of these articles is appended
and the writer asks permission to incorporate them :by reference, subject to later expansion
in the next installment of this paper.
1. Before considering the causes that have produced the present confusion of judicial
voices, a tribute to the American people must be paid. Twice in recent years the Supreme
Court has been front-page news: Once in 1937, ,when the Supreme Court Packing Bill was
presented to Congress. Wilkinson, The President's Plan Respecting The Supreme Court
(1937) 6 FoanAxsl L. Rav. 179; again, in 1944, when the Court disclosed internal quarrels
regarding the very essentials of the judicial process. On both occasions, the rank and file
of the American people correctly sensed the proper solution. In the Supreme Court pack-
ing issue, the popular demand was: Let the Supreme Court alone. Hands off the judiciary.
The popular position prevailed and the Court Packing Bill was defeated.
Once more the Supreme Court is in trouble, this time because of internal dissension. The
man of the street, while unable to express his reasoning in legal language, strongly im-
plores the Supreme Court to bring back the certainty and continuity of law; to get away
from the chaos and confusion of independent and individualized decisions. Just as the people
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"duly mindful of the necessary demands of continuity in civilized
society,"2 has produced more dissents and vigorous cross-court criti-
cisms than any other Supreme Court in the same brief span of time.3
Here is a Court that was carefully selected under a formula that not
only permitted but even defended the Presidential right to probe iro
each appointee's social, economic and political leaning and considered
that such matters were proper subjects of inquiry-all for the purpose
of manning the Court with Justices ready to carry into effect the "applied
politics" of the administration in the noblest sense of the word.4 No
wonder that the people are disturbed and confused by the present picture
of judicial disunity and resultant uncertainty of law that provoked Jus-
tice Roberts to exclaim:
"The tendency to disregard precedents in the decision of cases like the present
has become so strong in this court of late as, in m view, to shake confidence in
defended the Supreme Court against external interference by the Chief Executive in 1937,
they now petition the Supreme Court to get rid of the internal dissension which will produce
the deplorable consequence, in the words of Justice Roberts, "that the administration of
justice will fall into disrepute." Note 24 infra.
The comment in the daily press and journals of public opinion ranges from the moderate
plea of AMERICA that the Supreme Court return to the doctrine of stare decisis which is
called "one of the oldest rules of law" [70 AMERICA 534 (1944)] to the severe indictment
that "we are drifting from constitutional government by laws to unconstitutional govern-
ment by men." N. Y. Journal-American, February 17, 1944 at p. 18. An interesting ob-
servation by a careful commentator, Mark Sullivan, warns that the divided condition of
the Supreme Court is more serious than the breach recently exposed between the President
and Congress. N. Y. Herald Tribune, Feb. 25, 1944 at p. 19. See Editorial, An Unstable
Court, N. Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1944 at p. 14.
2. Graves v. O'Keefe, 306 U. S. 466, 59 Sup. Ct. 595 (1939).
3. "The statistics show, in fact, that from a quantitative point of view at least, the re-
organized Supreme Court has become by far the most badly divided body in the history of
of that institution. President Roosevelt's first appointees to the Court took their seats during
the 1937-38 term. For the six terms preceding (i.e., from the 1931-32 term through the
1936-37 term), there were dissents to 16 per cent of all the full opinions written by the
Court. During the six terms of the reorganized Court (1937-38 through 1942-43), the
figure on dissents was 33 per cent-over twice as great." Pritchett, The Coming of the New
Dissent: The Supreme Court, 1942-43 (1943) 11 U. or Cm. L. REV. 49-50.
4. The most famous diiclosure of the stated executive policy of reviewing the political
and economic inclinations of a candidate for the Supreme Court is found in the so-called
President Theodore Roosevelt-Senator Lodge correspondence which preceded the appoint-
ment of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes to the Supreme Court of the United States. The perti-
nent part of President Theodore Roosevelt's letters to Senator Lodge is found in FRAmFuR-
TER, LAW AND PoLIIcs (1,933) 66-67, where Professor (now Justice) Frankfurter approves of
the right of the-President to inquire about the political and economic background of judi-
cial candidates.
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the consistency of decision and leave the courts below on an uncharted sea of
doubt and difficulty without any confidence that what was said yesterday will
hold good tomorrow. . .
It is the purpose of this paper to attempt the appraisal of the current
criticisms of the Supreme Court by laynen and lawyers and to consider
the causal factors which have brought about the discord in the national
judiciary.
The argument will move through three stages:
(1) Contrary to the popular (and some professional) opinion, the
present division in the Supreme Court is not of -recent origin. True, two
recent cases, both decided in 1944,6 have become front page news and
expose to the public eye a breakdown which had been long in the
making. The new Court has never been a closely united body; its dis-
unity has merely been made more objective in recent decisions of the
Court.
(2) The cause of this confusion in judicial minds is not simply stated
or easily explained. It is rather a mixture of a number of factors of vary-
ing weights and influence, some visible and known for many years, some
concealed beneath the surface-all ignored or dismissed as inconsequen-
tial when constructive critics have directed attention to them. In the
light of the full sweep of extreme jurisprudential isms parading the
American scene, the wonder is that this copia verborum current in the
law has so long escaped the chambers of the United States Supreme
Court.
(3) The cure for the present disorder is a return to order; a revival
of constitutional and common law techniques and traditional values
presently in eclipse; a recognition of the importance of -the doctrine of
stare decisis; a revival of legal principles; a critical examination of the
direful consequences of pseudo-science, functional nonsense, surrealism
and other fringe-propagandism which have penetrated into the law in
the past twenty-five years.
A favorite aphorism of a few years ago was: "The law must be stable,
but it cannot stand still.")7 It would seem that the Supreme Court has
been functionipg of late under another formula which emphasizes the
mobility rather than the stability of decisions. But all is not dark and
5. Roberts, J., dissenting in Mahnich v. Southern Steamship Company, - U. S. -, 64
Sup. Ct. 455, 464 (1944).
6. Notes 8 and 12 infra.
7. POUND, INTERPRETATIONS oF LEGAL HISTORY (1923) 1; CARDozo, THE GROWTH OF
LAW (1924) 143.
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dreary. It may be a healthy and helpful sign to observe the public dis-
closure by the members of the Supreme Court of the submersion of judi-
cial precedents and the infiltration of the personal viewpoints of the
Justices in the decision of particular cases. This open and pronounced
criticism of departure from precedents may well be followed by a deter-
mined effort to stabilize constitutional law. Let us hope that this atti-
tude of mea culpa in the judicial ranks may be followed by the recogni-
tion that motion and change in the legal order may spell chaos and con-
fusion rather than progress and improvement.
Two Recent Opinions
The two cases which focused attention upon the Supreme Court's in-
ternal disputes were both decided in the month of January in the year
1944. They at once attracted public interest because of their disclosure
of the juristic quarrels in the Supreme Court. In the first case, Mercoid
Corporation v. Mid-Continental Investment Comparny,' decided January
3e 1944, there was involved a suit for contributory infringement of
patents.9 The intra-court aspects of the Mereoid case are found in the
separate opinion of Justice Black in which Jitstice Murphy concurred"
and in the dissenting opinion of Justice Frankfurter. 1 Justice Black
and Justice Murphy are objecting that the dissenting opinion of Justice
Frankfurter rests upon no pertinent precedents but is the product of the
8. - U. S. -, 64 Sup. Ct. 268 (1944).
9. In this case, which involved the alleged "contributory infringement" of a patent,
the Supreme Court reversed the Circuit Court and held that the doctrine of contributory
infringement should be sharply and substantially limited. Since the patentee sought to
extend the use of the patent to unpatented devices, equity would refuse the patentee or
its licensee relief even if contributory infringement were proven.
10. Justice Black, concurring with the majority, wrote a separate opinion directed
largely against the dissenting opinion of Justice Frankfurter. Justice Black charged that the
dissenting Justice had rejected the customary methods of statutory construction and erect-
ed the doctrine of contributory infringement out of his own ideas of ethics and morals.
Continuing. he said: "And for judges to erect their interpretation of statutes on nothing
but their own conceptions of 'morals' and 'ethics' is, to say the least, dangerous business2'
Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continental Ins. Co., - U. S. -, -, 64 Sup. Ct. 268, 274-275 (1944).
11. Justice Frankfurter in his dissenting opinion [Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continental Ins.
Co., - U. S. -, -, 64 Sup. Ct. 268, 276-277 (1944)] strikes back sharply and contends
that "The idea of contributory infringement was woven into the fabric of our law and
has been part of it for now more than seventy years." He replies that the personal judge-
made law is not of his making but is found in the opinion of the majority in the Mercoid
case who are charged with framing "gratuitous innuendoes against a principle of law
which, within its proper bounds, is accredited by legal history as well as ethics."
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dissenting. Justice's own original formula devoid of all reference to
statutory language and legislative history.
A few weeks later, on January 30, 1944, the Supreme Court decided
Mahnich v. Southern Steamship Company2 involving the liability of
the defendant for injuries to a seaman while at sea caused by a fall from
a staging which gave way because of a defect in the rope supporting it. 3
The important point of present interest is found in the dissenting opinion
of Mr. Justice Roberts, this time Justice Frankfurter joining in the
dissent. It contains a severe indictment of the current inclination of the
Supreme Court to engage in decision-hopping and precedent-hurdling:
"The evil resulting from overruling earlier considered decisions must be evi-
dent. In the present case, the court below naturally felt bound to follow and
apply the law as clearly announced by this court. If litigants and lower federal
courts are not to do so, the law becomes not a chart to govern conduct but a
game of chance; instead of settling rights and liabilities it unsettles them.
Counsel and parties will bring and prosecute actions in the teeth of the decisions
that such actions are not maintainable on the not improbable chance that
the asserted rule will be thrown overboard. Defendants will not know whether
to litigate or to settle for they will have no assurance that a declared rule will
be followed. But the more deplorable consequence will inevitably be that the
administration of justice will fall into disrepute. Respect for tribunals must
fall when the bar and the public come to understand that nothing that has been
said in prior adjudication has force in a current controversy."14
These two cases expressly disclose the growing dissension in the
Supreme Court of the United States. But they were preceded by other
violations of stare decisis since the reformed Court came into being.
The other evidences of departure were more concealed, less sensational
but sufficiently frequent to cause concern among the critics of the New
Constitutionalism.
12. - U. S. -, 64 Sup. Ct. 455 (1944).
13. The majority held that the libellant was entitled'to indemnity for injuries suffered,
as well as for maintenance and cure. The Trial Court denied indemnity and the Circuit
Court of Appeals, by a divided Court, affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the lower
courts and found that the vessel was unseaworthy because of the defective rope, even
though there was sound rope on board.
The dissenting opinion of Justice Roberts was based largely upon an analysis of the
same legal authorities and argued that under stare decisis, the past decisions of the Supreme
Court clearly prevented such a reversal. For an analysis of the Mahnich case, see Obiter
Dicta, infra pp. 132-135.
14. Mahnich v. Southern Steamship Co., - U. S. -, -, 64 Sup. Ct. 465, 463 (1944).
Italics added.
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"What of Stare Decisis?"'5
The judgment of the public and the press that the Court is abandon-
ing case-law for a succession of single decisions eked out by the Justices
on the basis of the particular circumstances of each case is strongly sup-
ported by other detours from the juristic highway of stare decisis. The
doctrine was crumbling long before the Justices publicly proclaimed
the fact in the Mahnich and Mercoid cases. The recent case of the
United States v. Schneiderman,"8 involving the right'of the United States
to denaturalize a Communist, is another decision wherein the Supreme
Court rode through contrary precedents to reach a desired result.' 7 The
history of the Flag Salute cases discloses judicial shifts that are start-
lingly rapid.' In 1936 Chief Justice Stone warned his brothers on the
old Court that the "only check upon our own [judicial] exercise of power
is our own sense of self restraint.' 9 He deemed it necessary in '1943
to repeat this warning to the majority in the Schneiderman case when
he charged that they were departing from the settled line of cases, and
added a biting comment directed against the separate concurring opinion
of Justice Douglas stating that it rested upon a novel statutory construc-
tion, was framed "to meet the exigencies of the case" and resulted in
the "emasculation of the statute."2 The Mahnich case was not the first
occasion for Justice Roberts to become aroused at the departure of the
15. Pound, What of, Stare Decisis (1941) 10 FoRD mm L. REv. 1. Three years ago,
Dean Pound asked the question: "What of Stare Decisis?" and with remarkable prevision of
coming events forecast the present situation in the Supreme Court! "As things are today,
I cannot but Xhink that much of the attack on stare decisis is a part of the revival of
absolutism which is so prominent in political and juristic thought throughout the world.
It goes with the agitation for abrogation of the bills of rights, making the legislature the
sole judge of its own powers, and freeing administrative agencies from judicial review, of
which we have been hearing so much in recent years. While we are doing away with checks
and balances and putting other forms of official action at large, why not turn the judiciary
loose also? Why not set up a regime of free decision that is to allow courts to decide
cases as unique with no obligation to a uniform, predictable course of decision?" Italics
added.
16. U. S. v. Schneiderman, 320 U. S. 118, 63 Sup. Ct. 1333 (1943).
17. For a documented criticism of the opinion in the Schneiderman case, see Kennedy,
The Schneiderman Case-Some Legal Aspects (1943) 12 FoRDHAm L. REv. 231; Timasheff,
The Schneiderman Case-Its Political Aspects (1943) 12 FoRDHAM L. REV. 209.
18. Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586, 60 Sup. Ct. 1010 (1940);
W. Va. State Board of Education v. Barnett, 319 U. S. 624, 63 Sup. Ct. 1178 (1943). See
(1943) 42 MicH. L. REV. 186.
19. U. S. v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 78-79, 56 Sup. Ct. 312 (1936).
20. U. S. v. Schneiderman, 320 U. S. 118, 63 Sup. Ct. 1333, 1359-1360 (1943).
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reformed Court from the path of settled precedents.2 Additional in-
stances are at hand to lend further support to the judgment of the public
and press that the Supreme Court, as presently op6rating, has gone far
afield in the fabrication of new constitutional law and the overruling of
settled precedents.'
Of course dissents were not infrequent in other periods of the history
of the Supreme Court; divided viewpoints have often prevailed. Indeed,
only a few years ago, prior to the reconstruction of the Court the mem-
bers were divided into two groups, the Conservatives and the Liberals.
Yet the dividing line separating the two factions was clearly marked out;
their ideas and opinions followed a certain pattern and it was fre-
quently possible to venture a prediction of the exact division of the
Justices in a particular case based upon their past pronouncements.2a
21. The strong language of Justice Roberts in the Mahnkh case deploring the departure
of the Supreme Court from precedents was but the last of many similar expressions used
in recent years by Justice Roberts directed to earlier cases which manifest the same disregard
for judicial authorities by the reconstructed court. At least twice in 1939 and again in
1940, Justice Roberts warns against the breakdown of stare decisis. In Neirbo v. Bethlehem
Corporation, 308 U. S. 165, 179, 60 Sup. Ct. 153 (1939) he says: "I §ee no reason at this
late day to attribute a new effect to the statute when Congress has not seen fit to express a
view contrary to that embodied in this court's construction of the law; though this might
at any time be done. The principle of stare decis seems to me to make against such a
change." And again in Higgins v. Smith,' 308 U. S. 473, 487, 60 Sup. Ct. 355 Justice Rpberts
declares in his dissenting opinion: "The action taken in this case seems to me to make it
impossible for a citizen safely to conduct his affairs in reliance upon any settled body of
court decisions." (Cf. page 5, supra). See also Roberts, J., dissenting in Helvering v.
Hallock, 309 U. S. 106, 60 Sup. Ct. 444 (1940). It is interesting to note that in the Neirbo
case as well as in Helvering v. Hallock, supra, Justice Roberts is criticizing the opinion
of Justice Frankfurter who now joins Justice Roberts in his dissent in the Mahnich case.
22. It should be noted that Justice Roberts does not contend that constitutional law
must remain frozen. He says: "Of course the law may grow to meet changing conditions.
I do not advocate slavish adherence to authority where new conditions require new rules
of conduct." Mahnich v. Southern Steamship Co., - U. S., -, -, 64 Sup. Ct. 455, 463-464-
(1944). It must be conceded that the new Supreme Court has with justification over-
thrown many cases that had become fossilized under the Old Court. The "shift in consti-
tutional doctrine" has brought many beneficial changes in constitutional law. But the diffi-
culty of late is that the "shift" has become a "swing-shift." The Court has forgotten the
qualifications that changes in constitutional law "should not derive from mere ,private
judgment" and that the justices "must be duly mindful of the necessary demands of con-
tinuity in civilized society." (Graves v. O'Keefe, 306 U. S. 466, 59 Sup. Ct. 595 (1939).
Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U. S. 371, 401, 63 Sup. Ct. 636 (1942) lists recent cases wherein
the Supreme Court has re-examined and reversed earlier cases.
23. "I remember very well the day.the United States Supreme Court published its de-
cision in the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Case. A professor who had come into my
office had inquired of me whether the decision had yet been published. I did not know.
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But no more. The present innovation in the matter of the divergencies
of opinion in the Supreme Court is the discovery that intra-court contro-
versies are not subject to definite alignment; the complaint is general
among the members of the Court that individual justices are guilty of
departing from the paths of precedents in particular cases. It is there-
fore impossible to label definitely and finally the conservative, center
and liberal groups, for-they are varying their affiliations from case to
case.
24
What are the influences and factors which may explain-in part at
least 25-- the apparently sudden (but in fact gradual) departure of the
Supreme Court from stare decisis, from constitutional principles and
static precedents?
The Influence of Holmes
The influence of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes looms large in the
reconstructed Supreme Court. Someone has truly said that back of
every great institution is the shadow of a man, whose life and philosophy
have shaped and molded the form and substance of the institution.
Certain it is that the influence of Oliver Wendell Holmes in directing the
course of current Supreme Court decisions is of paramount importance.
Here is an intellectual giant acclaimed in superlatives by his myriad of
'Well,' he said, 'I will tell you what it will be. The decision will be against the statute,
and the vote will be unanimous.' While he was speaking, another professor entered my
office, just in time to hear this prophecy. 'You are wrong,' said the other professor, 'it will
be a five to four decision.' And he named the five judges who would vote for affirmance.
His forecast was absolutely accurate. Both these professors knew the rules of law. One of
them, apparently, knew more about the judges than the other." Pyne, Book Review (1935)
4 FORDHAm L. REV. 153.
24. Justice koberts has clearly stated in the Mahnich decision (note 5 supra) that with
the decrease of certainty in the law it is inevitable, that there will come an increase in
the take-a-chance attitude toward litigation. Any litigant has a chance to win. Why not
try it? The hunch-process and the "hat-pin" approach, rather than the study of case law
in precedents, decide the question of the feasibility of .an appeal to the Supreme Court.
Incidentally, it should be noted that the hunch process is defended in high places. Hutche-
son, The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of The "Hunch" in Judicial Decisions (1929)
14 CoRN. L. Q. 274.
25. The reader will kindly note the reservation incident to the statement in the text.
The influences and factors to be noted may explain the departure of the Supreme Court
and in part; or again they may not. But it is submitted that the named factors and per-
sonalities move in the same direction as the Court; and they point more conclusively to
a departure from stare decisis than they do to its enforcement. Whether these influences
may have reached the individual justices of the Supreme Court is not known of knowable.
But one way to recapture stare decisii is for the court to avoid the danger of possible
contamination with all matters hostile to the doctrine.
[Vol. 13
1944] PORTRAIT OF THE NEW SUPREME COURT 9
friends and followers, a judge whose dissents in a long life on the Bench
have been lifted after his death to the status of prevailing opinions 6
Chesterton reminds us that the most important thing about a man is
his philosophy; Justice Frankfurter nods assent and points to the fact
that Holmes "was essentially a philosopher who turned to the law.""'
How stands his philosophy of life and law? What are his views re-
garding the solidarity of precedents, the importance of principles, the
doctrine of stare decisis? The answer is readily obtained from a review
of his writings and decisions. Reverting to his philosophical papers, it
is clear that dominant traits of Holmes' character were skepticism,
cynicism of eternal values, dismissal of natural law and abhorrence of
principles. Logic and the syllogism were of no enduring value; 8 an
ounce of experience was worth a pound of logic. Yet paradoxically
Holmes closed his eyes to the records of experience in daily life by
refusing to read the daily newspapers; rejected all scientific data even
when tendered by his close friend and associate Justice Brandeis and
despised fact-research. Truth to him was merely "the majority vote of
that nation that could lick all the others."3 He did not permit legisla-
tive experiments because he had confidence in the ability of man to im-
prove himself. Even here the pessimism of Holmes beclouds his juris-
tic thinking, his attitude seems to be: Let 'em have what they want-
and suffer the consequences. Man is a "cosmic ganglion" whose bowels
are rated as important as his brains.31
This is not the time or the place to exhaust the appraisal of Holmes,
philosopher, jurist, man. Our only purpose is to point to the fact that
the Halmesian influence in the Supreme Court does not make for soli-
26. From Graves .v. O'Keefe, 306 U. S. 466, 59 Sup. Ct. 595 (1939), decided shortly
after the reconstruction of the Supreme Court down to the present time, Justice Holmes'
former dissents have frequently been changed to majority opinions. Shriver, Great Dis-
senter-Whose Dissents Now Prevail (1941) 47 CASE & Comm. 6.
27. FRA xKF RTER, LAW AND POLITCS (1939) 68.
28. 2 HoLmEs-PoLocx LETEs (1941) 17.
Harold Laski sums up Holmes' attitude toward principles in the following words: "The
keynote of Mr. Justice Holmes' political outlook is a rejection of absolutist concepts. All
principles are true in merely a relative way. The individual is not a subject of 'rights which
the state is not entitled to invade. Men are social animals; and what they are entitled to
do is a matter of degree, born of experience in some particular time and place." Laski, The
Political Philosophy of Mr. Justice Holmes (1931) 40 YAIE L. J. 683.
29. 2 HoLrsS-PoLLocK LETTERS (1941) 13, 17, 18.
30. Hou us, Co , mcr LEoAL PApERS (1920) 310.
31. 2 HoLms-Pou ocx LEERS (1941) 22.
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darity of law or permanency of precedents; nor does it make for the
enlargement or enforcement of such doctrines among his followers.
Today there are two diametrically antagonistic views about Oliver
Wendell Holmes. Superlatives of praise are common. There are reasons
for this general adoration of Holmes, the man; adequate but more tenta-
tive justification for the wide acclaim of Justice Holmes, the jurist. But
the doubtful question which is already under examination is the validity
and permanency of his contribution to legal philosophy and jurispru-
dence, his off-bench viewpoint of life and philosophy.
The encomiums of praise piling up during the many years of his life
and in the few years since his death, are now offset by a growing dissent
which is subjecting the philosophy of Holmes to a severe and convinc-
ing criticism.32
The question might be asked: How could two violently contrasted
estimates come forth from scholars motivated only by a search for the
philosopher's real contribution to the law? Perhaps it is because we
are too close to Holmes, the man. 3 His friends, his succession of youth-
ful secretaries, his devoted followers are still alive and walk in his foot-
steps. They are like the a priori men whom he so strongly condemned
for their ceaseless devotion to natural law. Holmes must also be rated
the "best" or they are ready to fight like the poor fellow in Holmes'
Essay on Natural Law.34
An inspection of the philosophic fields in which he labored discloses
that the seeds of skepticism, cynicism and "can't-helps" which he planted
are now producing a bumper crop of current doubts, despair and pessi-
mism, tilled, cultivated and harvested by his devoted followers. Archibald
MacLeish, a friendly critic, truly sets forth the dangerg of leading our
young men into a legal wilderness and then daring them to find their
way home: "The skepticism and the philosophic detachment which sat so
easily with Mr. Justice Holmes himself, giving flavor and taste to
his strong humanity as salt gives flavor and taste to fresh meat, had a
caustic and pickling effect on lesser vitalities, so that many of the great
32. Ford, The Fundamentals of Holmes' Juristic Philosophy (1942) 11 FonHAmr L. REV.
255; Simms, A Dissent From Greatness (1942) 28 VA. L. Rav. 467; Ford, Book Review
(1943) 12 FoiwrAw L. REV. 303; (1943) 12 FoRDH3 L. Rav. 299.
33. So states Attorney-General Biddle: "It is too early to determine what Mr. Justice
Holmes will mean to future generations of Americans." BIDDLE, MR. JusTic HOLMFS
(1942) 1; Max Lerner says that Holmes' lasting contribution' will be to English style
rather than to constitutional law. Lerner, The Mind and Faith of Justice Holmes (1943) xlix.
34. HousEs, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS (1920) 310.
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justice's disciples were left only with the skepticism and the detachment
and without the human and believing force."3 5 If the plight of the
Supreme Court today is due to the breakdown of precedents and the
refusal fo adhere to principles, this failure may be attributed in no small
degree to the devotion, implicit or explicit, of the members of the
Supreme Court to the memory and juristic philosophy of Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes.
Arrival of Pragmatic Philosophy
"... A pragmatist turns his bizck resolutely and once for all upon a
lot of inveterate habits dear to professional philosophers. He turns away
from abstraction and insufficiency, from verbal solutions, from bad
a priori reasons, from fixed principles, closed systems, and pretended
absolutes and origins. He turns towards concreteness and adequacy,
towards facts, towards action and towards power. That-means the em-
piricist temper regnant and the rationalist temper sincerely given up. It
means the open air and possibilities of nature, as against dogma, arti-
ficiality, and the pretence of finality in truth '36
About the time that Holmes was sowing the seeds of skepticism and
doubt regarding the permanency, validity or utility of principles and
concepts of the law, a philosophic movement strongly supporting the
Holmesian jurisprudences7 was developing in America under the leader-
35. FRANKFURTER, LAW AND POLITICS (1939) XVii.
A striking example of Holmes' skepticism directed against a young disciple is found
in the correspondence which passed between him and Dr. Wu, the Chinese philosopher.
A few sentences from this correspondence and other writings reinforce the point that
MacLeish made. "I do not believe or know anything about absolute truth.. . . I noticed
once that you treated it as a joke when I asked you if you weren't dreaming me... you
never can prove that you were awake. .. ." HoLmS, His BooK NomcEs M UNcoLLECTm
PAPERS (Shriveres ed. 1939) 166. "It seems to me clear that the tdtima ratio, not only regum,
but of private persons, is force, and that at the bottom of all private relations, however
tempered by sympathy and all the social feelings, is a justifiable self-preference." Id. at 44.
36. JAmds, PRAGmAsa-A NEw NAmm FOR SoME Orm WAYS OF TINING (1925) 51;
reprinted in HAL, READmIGS In JUpasPRUDEN E (1938) 227-229.
37. It is true that Holmes scoffed at pragmatism and called it "an amusing humbug-
like most of William James's speculations . I."" 1 HOLMEs-PoLMOCK LETTERS (1941) 139.
But it is also true that the substantial elements of pragmatism find strong support in his
philosophy. Every one of the ingredients in pragmatism mentioned by William James, a
boyhood friend of Justice Holmes (supra note 36) is in accord with the viewpoint of
Holmes. William James states that. the "tough-minded" pragmatists are materialistic, sen-
sationalistic, skeptical and irreligious. JAss, PRACa wAms (1909) 12. Is there any doubt
that justice Holmes discloses the noted characteristics? Gregg, The Pragmatism of Mr. Jus-
tice Holmes (1943) 31 GEo. L. J. 262.
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ship of William James and later of John Dewey, 8 which was called
Pragmatism. 9 This distinctly American philosophy stressed the prac-
tical results of a given course of action and contended that the over-all
effects and consequences of human action determined all human, moral
and religious ideals. If the proposed action works it is good and true;
if it does not work it is bad and false.
This is not the place to dissect or evaluate Pragmatism in all its
aspects. Our sole purpose, as in the matter of the appraisal of Holmes'
legal philosophy, is to point out that the influence of pragmatism was,
and is, important in explaining the current breakdown of precedents,
the elimination of principles and the rejection of legal concepts. Not
without reason is the pragmatic approach called an "engineering inter-
pretation" by Dean Pound,4" who first publicized the importance of the
pragmatic approach in the matter of law reform and accepted its car-
dinal principle that "the essence of good is simply to satisfy demand."'
The key formula of legal pragmatism was expressed by its distinguished
promoter in the following words:
"... if in any field of human conduct or in any human relation the law,
with such machinery as it has, may satisfy a social want without a dispropor-
tionate sacrifice of other claims, there is no eternal limitation inherent in the
nature of things, there are no bounds imposed at creation, to stand in the way
of its doing so."'42
It is not necessary to point out that neither the natural law nor the
inalienable rights of the individual nor the permanency of constitutional
principles are retained in the stated pragmatic prescription. Any, and
therefore, all claims of human kind may be translated into the law
provided that the given claim does not clash against the disproportionate
claims of other members of the community.
Twenty years ago Dean Pound cautiously warned that this "gimme"-
38. To understand the immense influence of pragmatism in America, one must realize
that it has substantially captured the educational techniques of many colleges and universi-
ties. John Dewey is America's pragmatic schoolmaster and was influential in the recasting
of educational programs in terms of the pragmatic approach. ESSAYS IN HONOR OF Jom
DEw EY (1939). It is interesting to note that John Dewey offered his pragmatism to the
law. Dewey, Logical Method and Law (1924) 10 CORN. L. Q. 17.
39. Pragmatism is a term of comparatively recent origin in philosophy. It seems to have
been first used in print by William James in 1898.
40. POUND, INTERPRETATION or LEGAL HISTORY (1923) 127.
41. Id. at 157.
42. POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (1922) 97-98.
[Vol. 13
1944] PORTRAIT OF THE NEW SUPREME COURT 13
philosophy might be put to ill use.43 His direful statement has come
true." During the past twenty years pragmatism has been the source
of a constantly mounting trend to treat law as force, a struggle for power.
To sum up the pragmatic influence in the law: If legal pragmatism is
right, then our common law is wrong. If the only true solution is the
'one that works, then principles and standards have no value unless and
until it is shown that they, work. Indeed Pragmatism offers a flexible
weighing machine which permits the Supreme Court, or any court, to
consider afresh each case as it is presented without reliance or de-
pendence upon former precedents. The pragmatic formula is always
the same: try anything once and at once; the true rule of law is not
determinable until the results and consequences have been appraised 5
and even then the truth, like an A & P special, is good only for the day!41
Under the full sweep of the pragmatic jurisprudence there is and can
be no certainty in the law.
To repeat Justice Roberts' warning about the evil of disregarding pre-
cedents and to apply it to the* doctrines of legal pragmatism it may be
truly said that the pragmatic approach leaves the courts "an unchartered
sea of doubt and difficulty without any evidence that what was. said
yesterday will hold good tomorrow .... ,,4
In 1925 the writer, after analyzing the then recent entry of Pragma-
tism into the law, concluded as follows:
"Motion is necessary in the development of law, but there is a present ten-
dency to treat change as synonymous with improvement in the legal order. It
43. POUND, op. cit. supra 164, n. 40.
44. Dean Pound no longer stresses the weighing of claims and wants as the end of law.
His pragmatic test, defended two decades ago is now displaced by a new prophecy. "But
some part of the path of the juristic thought of tomorrow is already apparent. It seems
to be toward an ideal of cojperation rather than one of competitive self-assertion." PouxD,
Socisi. CoNTRoL TnOUGHi LAw (1942) 126-127. Italics inserted. Cf. note 42 supra.
45. Llewellyn, The Conditions For And The Aims and Methods of. Legal Research.
(1929) HANDaoox oF TaE AssociAaToN or AmRicAN LAW ScitooL.s 35: "We shall not get
down to the real study of 'how rules work' until we come to see that until we know how
a rule works, we do not know what a rule is. A rule of law conceived merely as a formula
of words is emptiness. A rule of law acqlires content and meaning only in terms of behavior.
First (and this under Holmes' formula) the behavior of future courts."
46. A story, probably apocryphal, is told about the lawyer who cited a few cases in
the Supreme Court which antedated the recent reorganization of the Court. One of the
Justices asked: "Do you offer these cases as existing law?" The lawyer replied, "Yes, if
the Court please, unless the earlier precedents are handed down after the manner of a rail-
road excursion ticket-good for this day only!"
47. Note 5 supra.
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is possible to infuse too much flexibility just as it has been admitted that the
old order paid too much attention to the finality of precedent. There is no
particular virtue in being on our way unless we know where we are going.
The cautious traveler is not averse to a guidebook; the experienced hunter in-
cludes a compass in his outfit; even the casual pedestrian does not disdain a
glance at the signboards in strange places. May we not suggest to the prag-
matic jurist the importance of taking on board similar protection against the
hurricane of social wants and demands, some instrumentalities-in the shape
of permanent constitutional principles and natural rights-before we engage
passage with him on the maiden voyage, before we give an unconditional wel-
come to pragmatism as a philosophy of law?"48
This appraisal and warning return reinforced' by the intervening events
of the past twenty years. The infiltration of the pragmatic influence
has contributed in substantial degree to the present judicial tendency
to depart from stare decisis, to substitute claims for rights, and to add to
the let-'em-have-what-they-want formula, derived from Justice Holmes,
the comfortable try-anything-once-and-at-once program of legal prag-
matism.
Comparing the potential evils of pragmatism with the present collapse
of precedents in the Supreme Court, the same general tendency may be
noted. The common danger under legal pragmatism and also under the-
judicial elimination of precedents is that each case, divorced from a stable
background of law, constitutional or common, will be subjected to the
supposedly superior wisdom and isolated intelligence of Nine Men, un-
hampered by juridical guide post or compass--save only the gladsome
and generous full-speed-ahead objective of satisfying all wants and
claims as far as possible. The practical defects of legal pragmatism (and
pragmatism prides itself on its practical advantages) are two-fold:
(1) No group of individuals, however wise, is capable of matching the
accumulated wisdom and experience of the past generations. "Law must
be stable" is an aphorism that is defensible as a means of preserving
the rich accumulations of ancient, medieval and modern law.
(2) Such stability also guarantees certainty and continuity of law; and
provides the element of predictability necessary in the conduct of societal
relations.
But legal pragmatism has one more serious defect: It tends to uproot
all ideals, principles and concepts of the legal order; erases all permanent
truths and reduces law to a mechanikal contraption for measuring con-
testing claims and wants, rather than rights and duties.
48. Kennedy, Pragmatism As a Philosophy of Law (1925) 9 MAQ. L. REv. 63, 76-77.
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Of course it is not possible to measure the exact effect of any factor
in producing the present disunity in the Supreme Court; nor is it claimed
that legal pragmatism is accepted by the Justices of the Supreme Court.49
The point that is herein made and emphasized is the striking parallel
which exists between an outstanding philosophy of law in the American
scene and the present trend in the Supreme Court. Whether the parallel
is coincidental or not, the contention is made that the movement in the
direction of the abandonment of precedents-and principles in American
law is undesirable whether it "just growed,' like Topsy or is an offshoot
of the James-Dewey philosophy of Pragmatism transplanted in the law.
Enter Realism*
(to be continued)
49. It seems that the present attitude of the Supreme Court-or the fluctuating majority
of the Justices-in some cases is occasionally pragmatic. If a decision can be given to a
party without a serious clash with other claims and wants, the decision may be so given,
even though past precedents are bypassed in the particular case, overruled if necessary but
sometimes ignored or distinguished. This may possibly explain the Mahnich case (supra
note 5) and the Schneiderman decision (supra note 16).
*It was hoped that the last, and most important chapter, in the history of the whittling
down of stare decidsi-the Advent of Legal Realism-might be completed. But the rapid
changes in the decisions of the Supreme Court, the many different schools of legal realism
and the deadly deadline prevented. Suffice it to say, subject to enlargement and proof
later, that Realism is the most important single -factor in the present breakdown of prece-
dents in American law. Justice Cardozo defined Realism as follows:
"The most distinctive product of the last decade in the field of jurisprudence is the
rise of a group of scholars styling themselves realists and content with nothing less than
revision to its very roots of the method of judicial decision which is part of the classical
tradition." Address before New York State Bar Association, 55 REPORT OP NEW YORK
STATE BAR ASSOCiATIoN (1932) 267.
Realism is especially revealing in its appraisal of constitutional law, the legal material
which is of the greatest interest in the Supreme Court. Our organic law, as appraised
by some of the Realists, has been reduced to the proportions of a "totem" or "fetish"
surrounded by "myths" and "folklore."
A bibliography of articles written by the author has been added in support of the above
article.
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